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RÉSUMÉ : Contrairement à ce qui est pris d’ordinaire pour acquis, le Commentateur Anonyme du 
Théétète est philosophiquement stimulant, comme le démontre la confrontation avec le Stoï-
cisme. Le Commentateur Anonyme déploie une stratégie subtile, ne visant pas tant à rejeter 
des doctrines nettement stoïciennes qu’à les incorporer dans son propre système platonicien, 
en présupposant que seul ce dernier peut assurer des fondements adéquats aux doctrines. Le 
Commentateur Anonyme peut de la sorte s’approprier le Stoïcisme et régler de manière défini-
tive l’ancienne querelle entre Stoïcisme et Platonisme. Qui plus est, le Stoïcisme n’est pas une 
question séparée, mais il fait partie d’une question plus large. Car la comparaison avec le 
Stoïcisme aide aussi le Commentateur Anonyme à défendre son interprétation unitaire de la 
tradition académique platonicienne. Commenter un texte n’est pas une pratique neutre, mais 
bien plutôt un des aspects les plus importants de la philosophie post-hellénistique. 
ABSTRACT : Contrary to what is usually assumed, the Anonymous Commentator on the Theaetetus 
is philosophically stimulating, as the confrontation with Stoicism shows. The Anonymous 
Commentator displays a subtle strategy, aiming not so much to reject distinctively Stoic doc-
trines as to incorporate them into his own Platonist system, on the assumption that only the 
latter can secure adequate foundations to the doctrines. The Anonymous Commentator can 
thus appropriate Stoicism and definitely settle the ancient quarrel between Stoicism and Pla-
tonism. Besides, Stoicism is not a separate issue, but is part of a wider issue. For the compari-
son with Stoicism also helps the Anonymous Commentator to defend his unitary interpretation 
of the Platonic-Academic tradition. Commenting a text is not a neutral practice but one of the 
most important aspects of post-Hellenistic philosophy. 
______________________  
I. 
ver the years, the philosophical importance of ancient commentaries on Plato 
and Aristotle has become unequivocal, and many efforts have been devoted to 
show that the commentators often prove capable of many unexpected subtleties. This 
is also true of the Anonymous Commentator on the Theaetetus (henceforth Anon.), 
but in the opposite direction. Since it is the first extant Platonist commentary, its 
O 
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historical importance cannot be dismissed. But Anon.’s (relatively) early date1 has 
also served scholars to point out his philosophical limits and deficiencies. Admit-
tedly, in many cases it is difficult to deny Anon.’s “stupefying banality”2 or to dispute 
that he is “uninspiring”.3 Yet, the situation is more complex, as was made clear by the 
new commented edition by David Sedley and Guido Bastianini, which encouraged 
closer scrutiny and has shown that Anon. is not always uninspiring or trivial. The aim 
of my paper is to further contribute to the rehabilitation of Anon.’s reputation. More 
precisely, I will concentrate on his confrontation with Stoicism. At first sight an in-
terest for Stoicism may appear out of place in a commentary devoted to Plato’s 
Theaetetus — a dialogue written many decades before Zeno entered the philosophical 
scene. A possible explanation for this anachronism is that the Stoics are randomly 
hinted at for didactical purposes, as a mean exploited by Anon. to teach some major 
points without an effective interest for the philosophy of the Porch.4 In fact, as I will 
try to show, the confrontation with Stoicism is a substantial issue for Anon.’s Platon-
ism, that will lead to a better assessment of his overall philosophical position. 
II. 
1) In the extant part of the commentary, which covers only a small part of the dia-
logue (until 158a), the Stoics are explicitly mentioned four times.5 At stake are funda-
mental doctrines such as the kathekonta, the oikeiosis, virtues and the “growing 
argument”. Given the continuous rivalry between Stoics and Platonists in the post-
Hellenistic centuries, and given Anon.’s Platonist commitment, it is hardly surprising 
to see that his references to Stoicism are polemical. The most explicit example is the 
discussion of the oikeiosis theory (V 3-VIII 6). The motivation for dealing with this 
polythryleton (VII 21) theory is given by Theaetetus 143d1-5, where Socrates says 
that he cares more about the young men of Athens than about those of Cyrene. 
Plato’s verb for “caring” is kedesthai. Since one kind of oikeiosis was called kede-
                                       
 1. On palaeographical grounds the papyrus dates to the IInd century AD, and it was assumed that the commen-
tary was composed in this same period. Harold TARRANT (“The Date of Anonymous In Theaetetum”, Clas-
sical Quarterly, 33 [1983], p. 161-187), and David SEDLEY (in G. BASTIANINI, D.N. SEDLEY, Commentar-
ium in Platonis “Theaetetum”, in Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, III, Firenze, Olschki, 1995, 
p. 227-562), argued for an earlier date (Ist century BC), but the hypothesis raised more doubts than ap-
proval, see J. OPSOMER, In Search of the Truth. Academic Tendencies in Middle Platonism, Brussel, Paleis 
der Academiën, 1998, p. 34-36 ; C. BRITTAIN, Philo of Larissa. The Last of the Academic Sceptics, Oxford, 
OUP, 2001, p. 249-254 ; M. BONAZZI, Un dibattito tra academici e platonici sull’eredità di Platone. La 
testimonianza del commentario anonimo al Teeteto, in Papiri filosofici IV, Firenze, Olschki, 2002, p. 41-74. 
 2. J. DILLON, The Middle Platonists, London, Duckworth, 19962, p. 270. 
 3. D. RUNIA, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato, Leiden, Brill, 1986, p. 56. 
 4. Thus, for instance, late Neoplatonist commentators contrast presumably “sceptical arguments”, which had 
almost nothing to share with Pyrrhonians and Academics, but which served as a first introduction to issues 
such as the principle of non-contradiction or what is knowledge or substance ; see M. BONAZZI, Academici 
e Platonici. Il dibattito antico sullo scetticismo di Platone, Milano, Led, 2003, p. 13-55. 
 5. Zeno is also mentioned in a doxography with Plato and Aristotle at XV 16-29, see H. TARRANT, “Zeno on 
Knowledge or on Geometry ? The Evidence of Anon. ‘In Theaetetum’”, Phronesis, 29 (1984), p. 96-99. 
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monike (VII 28), Anon. can introduce the Stoics and interpret Socrates’ phrase as an 
implicit criticism of their doctrine.6 
More precisely, Anon. rejects oikeiosis as an adequate basis for justice (V 24-
27).7 The reason for claiming that oikeiosis is the basis of justice would be that there 
are no degrees of “appropriation” ; but this patently goes against evidence (V 34-35) 
because it is clear to everyone a) that there are different degrees of appropriation 
(some parts of ourselves being more important than others and we as a whole being 
more important still, V 36-VI 16) and b) that such different degrees are not mutually 
compatible, as the counter-example of the shipwrecked people shows, where only one 
of two sages can be saved (VI 17-VII 14). The critical situation of a shipwreck, by 
showing that “self-interest conflicts with the equal rights of the other person”, 8 
demonstrates that human nature is too egoistic to secure justice. Hence any degree or 
inequality between our own and another’s good are sufficient to dissolve the formal 
perfection of Stoic “justice”. Anon. can thus conclude in favour of Plato, who did not 
extract justice from our faulty nature but established its foundation in the divine with 
the doctrine of homoiosis toi theoi, assimilation to God (VII 15-20). 
What is remarkable is not so much the opposition between Platonism and Stoi-
cism as the fact that the oikeiosis doctrine, whose distinctively Stoic character is ac-
knowledged, is not completely rejected. Since human nature is intrinsically egoistic, 
oikeiosis alone does not suffice to ground ethics : the rejection of Stoic naturalism, 
and of what follows from Stoic naturalism, is patent. But this is not to say that the 
doctrine as such is abolished, for it still maintains a practical value and helps to clas-
sify the different kinds of human behaviour (VII 26-VIII 6). In this more circum-
scribed sense, Anon. further argues, the doctrine had already been introduced by 
Plato in the dialogues through both Socrates and the Sophists (VII 20-25). Anon.’s 
strategy is clear : by reducing its importance he can incorporate the Stoic theory into 
his own Platonist system. 
A second point, whose importance will become clear later, is that Anon., in his 
polemics against the Stoics, uses arguments of the sceptical Academy. The ship-
wrecked people argument is Carneadean (Cic. Resp. III 30 ; De off. III 90) and an-
other Academic argument, with an explicit mention of the oi ex Academias, immedi-
ately follows, exploiting against the Stoics what Stoics argued against Epicureans.9 
2) Sceptical Academic influence on Anon. is further confirmed by the account of 
the “growing argument” at LXX 18. The reason for introducing the growing argu-
ment is Protagoras’ “secret doctrine” of universal flux, namely that nothing “is” but 
everything “changes” (Tht. 152). Unfortunately, the papyrus is lacunose and hinders 
the reconstruction of Anon.’s argument, which has been dismissed as “surprising” by 
                                       
 6. D. SEDLEY, Commentarium in Platonis “Theaetetum”, p. 491. 
 7. See for example SVF I 197. 
 8. J. OPSOMER, In Search of the Truth, p. 45. 
 9. On this argument, see D. SEDLEY, Commentarium in Platonis “Theaetetum”, p. 493-494. 
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David Sedley.10 The standard version of the auxanomenos logos, as introduced by 
Epicharmus and later adopted by the sceptical Academics, argues that “just as num-
ber or measure when added to or subtracted from becomes a different number or 
measure, so too a person who grows or diminishes becomes a different person”.11 The 
Stoics countered the argument by distinguishing between “substance”, i.e. the mate-
rial substrate, and the “peculiarly qualified”, which is not identical with the substrate 
(though constituted by it), and which retains identity through the process of growth 
and diminution. 
Anon.’s criticism, as I reconstruct it from the damaged papyrus, disputes the 
Stoic distinction by claiming that if the “peculiarly qualified” is the principle of iden-
tity of a substance and the substance grows, it must necessarily follow that also the 
“peculiarly qualified” grows. For growth and diminution (of a substance), on the one 
hand, and the “peculiarly qualified” on the other mutually implicate one another,12 so 
that a) either the Stoics accept that the “peculiarly qualified” grows and diminishes or 
b), they have to deny the existence of growth and diminution. Anon.’s argument is 
not entirely clear ; however, further confirmation that the main target of the attack is 
the much disputed “peculiarly qualified” can be found in the next phrases. After no-
ticing that Pythagoras first introduced the argument and that also Plato used a version 
of it in the Symposium, Anon. says : 
Those from the Academy too argued for this, although they testified that they believed in 
the existence of growth. But because the Stoics try to demonstrate this, which is in no 
need of proof, they [the Academics] showed that if someone wants to prove what is evi-
dent, someone else will easily find more persuasive arguments to the contrary (LXX 12-
26). 
Since, together with the Stoics, both the Academics (who exploited the “growing 
argument” against the Stoics) and Anon. (who sides with the Academics) agree on 
the existence of growth, it is clear that the problem is the “peculiarly qualified”. More 
precisely, as it emerges from the above statement, the problem with Stoicism is their 
claim to “demonstrate” sensible reality. By introducing the “peculiarly qualified” as 
principle of identity, the Stoics claim to account for sensible things in themselves. 
But the result, contrary to their expectations, is that they redouble reality without ac-
counting for it. Stoics redouble reality by positing both substance and the “peculiarly 
qualified” as subjects of growth and diminution ; and this, far from being an account, 
is a further complication of a complicated issue, as the Academic counterarguments 
demonstrate.13 Eventually we get to the core problem. The major error of the Stoics is 
                                       
 10. D. Sedley (ibid., p. 554), who suggests a different reading of the argument. 
 11. A.A. LONG, D. SEDLEY, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. I, Cambridge, CUP, 1987, p. 172. 
 12. On “mutual implication” (antakolouthia), see also infra, n. 21. 
 13. An interesting parallel comes from POxy 2008 (= 28C Long-Sedley) : « […] since the duality which they 
say belong to each body is differentiated in a way unrecognizable by sense-perception. For if a peculiarly 
qualified thing like Plato is a body, and Plato’s substance is a body, and there is no apparent difference 
between these in shape, colour, size and appearance, but both have equal weight and the same outline, by 
what definition and mark shall we distinguish them and say that now we are apprehending Plato himself, 
now the substance of Plato ? For if there is some difference, let it be stated and demonstrated. But if <they 
can> not even say […] ». 
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methodological : they want to account for sensible reality in itself — but sensible re-
ality, taken in itself, does not require any scientific account (apodeixis).14 Regrettably 
Anon. is not so eloquent as one may desire, and the risk is to “overinterpretate” his 
remarks. But the reference to Plato’s Symposium (the reference clearly being to 207b-
208b) makes clear that the sensible world (and the “growing argument”) can be ex-
plained only when backed on the adequate metaphysical context. Even though it is 
difficult to reconstruct exactly Anon.’s argument, it is clear that his main target is the 
Stoic materialistic and immanentist perspective. Unlike the oikeiosis testimony, 
Anon. seems to reject in toto the Stoic doctrine of the “peculiarly qualified”.15 But in 
both cases the confrontation with the Stoics relies on the same anti-materialistic as-
sumption. More striking is Anon.’s attitude towards Hellenistic Academics, on which 
he depends for the “growing argument”. Anon. introduces Academic arguments as 
dialectical and ad hominem arguments, to the effect that they “look much more 
weakly sceptical”.16 As I will try to show this is not accidental. 
3) David Sedley has demonstrated that the short reference to kathekonta, “proper 
functions”, at IV 17-27, is part of a wider dispute among Stoics and Platonists (in-
cluding Old Academics such as Crantor and Polemo) on the role of practical ethics.17 
Whereas Stoics systematically classified practical moral rules and developed an all-
inclusive theory on “proper functions”, Platonists claimed that rules of conduct were 
best conveyed the way Plato conveyed them, by practical example.18 The portrayal of 
proper conduct we read in the dialogues are didactically far more effective than rule 
books and this explains why Platonists such as Anon., Proclus or Simplicius were not 
worried with detailed comments : “The proem includes a sketch of the appropriate 
action which the Stoics call kathekonta. Things of this kind are found most clearly in 
the Socratics, and do not need commentary” (IV 17-27 ; trans. Sedley).19 Anon. does 
avowedly use kathekon as a Stoic technical term. But while acknowledging borrow-
ing it from the Stoics, he claims that Plato’s philosophy provides a better explanation 
of the issue at stake. Again, the result is not the refusal but the appropriation of a dis-
tinctively Stoic doctrine and its marginalization within a wider context. 
                                       
 14. See also II 52-III 15 with M. BONAZZI, Academici e Platonici, p. 201-202. 
 15. Regrettably, due to lack of evidence, it is impossible to see whether Anon., after rejecting the Stoic theory 
of the “peculiarly qualified”, could also propose a Platonist interpretation of the same doctrine and on what 
ground. It is interesting, however, to note that later Platonists such as Porphyry employed the “peculiarly 
qualified”, cf. R. CHIARADONNA, “La teoria dell’individuo di Porfirio e l’idios poion stoico”, Elenchos, 21 
(2000), p. 303-331. 
 16. A.A. LONG, D. SEDLEY, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. II, p. 170. 
 17. D. SEDLEY, “The Stoic-Platonist Debate on Kathekonta”, in K. IERODIAKONOU, ed., Topics in Stoic Phi-
losophy, Oxford, OUP, 1999, p. 128-152. 
 18. Ibid., p. 138. 
 19. Cf. also PROCLUS, In Parm. 665, 37-666, 21 ; In Tim. I, 15, 23-16, 20 ; I, 18, 29-19, 9 ; I, 24, 12-17 ; 
Simpl. In Epict. Encheiridion 83, 4-14. It is not entirely clear what “Socratics” means : Anon. probably 
wants to state that an adequate account of “proper actions” is to be found not only in Plato’s Socratic logoi 
but also in those of others, like Xenophon or Aeschines ; see D. SEDLEY, Commentarium in Platonis 
“Theaetetum”, p. 490 and, for a much debated parallel, Cic. De or. III 67. 
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4) The fourth passage has not yet, to my knowledge, attracted the attention it de-
serves.20 Not surprisingly, the strategy followed by Anon. does not differ from what 
we have so far outlined. But as I will try to show, some points need to be taken into 
account for a better assessment of Anon.’s philosophy. At the beginning of the dia-
logue Socrates and Theodorus talk about human characters and natural gifts (143d-
144c). This leads Anon. to a short digression on virtues and “good natural disposi-
tions” (euphuiai ; XI 12-40, commenting on 144b1-3). What is at issue is the mutual 
implication (antakolouthia) of good natural dispositions and corresponding virtues. 
The problem of the mutual implication of virtues and the account of “good natural 
dispositions” was first formalized by Stoics.21 In the commentary, however, the em-
ployment of Stoic terms and notions does not involve any subordination to their doc-
trine. According to Anon., it is not necessary that good natural dispositions mutually 
imply one another (IX 37-X 3 ; XI 16-20), even though this may sometimes happen, 
as the very case of Theaetetus shows (X 10-12). Anon.’s claim rests on his part-based 
psychology : since natural dispositions relate to different parts of the human soul — 
some to the rational part others to the irrational part — it may be the case that a con-
trast emerges, perfectly mutual implication belonging only to perfectly developed 
virtues (IX 32-X 3). The psychological model also explains why the Stoics did not 
confront this problem : their psychological monism implies that there is only one 
good natural disposition (XI 22-31).22 Such assumption, Anon. further argues, legiti-
mates the inference that for the Stoics there is one virtue only. For, as Aristo claimed, 
if there is one euphuia only, it follows that there is one virtue only (XI 31-40). Ac-
cording to Anon., then, the problem of the mutual implication of euphuiai also helps 
to clarify the Stoic position on the mutual implication of virtues. 
Anon.’s claims are paradoxical. For the Stoics accepted that there was only one 
euphuia of the soul, but argued for a multiplicity of virtues (namely the four cardinal 
virtues : prudence, moderation, courage, justice) by asserting that virtues share the 
same principles each in its primary area of expertise.23 Therefore the exploitation of 
Aristo’s view as explanation of the “Stoic” position does not correctly account for 
Zeno and Chrysippus and other Stoics. As a matter of fact, this is confirmed by the 
last sentence (XI 38-40). As David Sedley noticed (p. 498), the phrase “as concede 
those to whom the argument is directed” occurs also at VI 38-40 in the context of the 
(sceptic) Academic struggle against the Stoics. On the basis of this parallel it is a fair 
assumption that the last sentence comes from Anon. himself and must not be attrib-
                                       
 20. An interesting exception is H. TARRANT, Recollecting Plato’s Meno, London, Duckworth, 2005, p. 158-
161. 
 21. On antakolouthia, see SVF III 275, 295-302 with J. WHITTAKER, Alcinoos. Enseignement des doctrines de 
Platon, introduction, texte établi et commenté par J.W. et traduit par P. Louis, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 
1990, p. 143, n. 479. In the Platonic corpus euphuia occurs only in Def. 412e4, 413d6, 8 ; the term was 
common in Aristotle (EN 1114b12) and the Peripatetic tradition (Stob. II, p. 131, 17 ; Alex. Aphr. Quaest. 
158, 14-18 ; Asp. 166, 22). For the Stoics, cf. SVF III 366 and A.M. IOPPOLO, Aristone di Chio e lo stoi-
cismo antico, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1980, p. 120-123. 
 22. See also O. LUSCHNAT, “Das Problem des ethischen Fortschritts in der alten Stoa”, Philologus, 102 (1958), 
p. 200. 
 23. See e.g. A.A. LONG, D. SEDLEY, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. I, p. 383-384. 
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uted to Aristo directly. And this shows that Anon. moves from an apparently impar-
tial report (XI 22-31) to a highly partisan argument (XI 31-40). 
The argument of the incompatibility between psychological monism and the plu-
rality of virtues does not occur only in Anon. Characteristically Plutarch too follows a 
similar line of attack.24 Whereas Aristo was wrong but consistent (wrong in positing 
one single psychic faculty, but consistent in deriving one single virtue from this fac-
ulty), Chrysippus was both wrong and inconsistent (wrong in positing one single psy-
chic faculty, and inconsistent in deriving many virtues from this single faculty). As so 
often in his anti-Stoic treatises, Plutarch is probably adopting, here also, an argument 
stemming from the Hellenistic Academy. Indeed, Academics regularly took advan-
tage of Aristo’s radical rigorism in their struggle against the Stoics.25 Like Plutarch, 
Anon. was probably also following the Hellenistic Academics. But it is no less re-
markable that Galen credits Posidonius with a similar argument26, so that one may 
speculate that Anon. was depending on a Stoic source — a perplexing but intriguing 
hypothesis. In recent years, however, Galen’s reliability has been doubted, and it is 
difficult to determine how Posidonian is the disapproval of the psychological monism 
that grounds the argument.27 Here as elsewhere, Galen applauds Posidonius for repu-
diating a cardinal Stoic doctrine ; yet it cannot be excluded that Posidonius was sim-
ply proposing a new (but not heterodox) interpretation of Chrysippus. Be that as it 
may, assessing exactly the identity of Anon.’s source is not what really matters. More 
important for our knowledge of Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic philosophy is to re-
alize how the same (or similar) set of arguments circulated among different philoso-
phers and schools, to be exploited in different ways. In this context Anon. is a good 
example of the polemical tone that distinguishes much philosophical speculation of 
the time. The practice of the commentary is far from being neutral. 
A further detail deserves attention. Anon. opposes to the Stoics not Plato alone, as 
we might expect from his Platonist commitment, but the “ancients” (XI 13). Clearly it 
is Plato and Aristotle who are referred to.28 This is not without importance for the 
reconstruction of Anon.’s historical views. The association between Plato and Aris-
totle implies a) that the latter was part of the Platonica familia and b) that his doctrines 
could therefore be legitimately exploited in a Platonic context. In the same spirit, at 
LXVIII 7-15, Anon. extracts some Aristotelian categories from Theaetetus 152.29 
                                       
 24. Plut. De virt. mor. 440e-441d. 
 25. In ethics, see for example Cic. De fin. IV 40, 43 ; Luc. 130. 
 26. Gal. De plac. VII 589 = fr. Posid. 182 Kidd. See Kidd’s comments ad loc. 
 27. See J. COOPER, “Posidonius on Emotions”, in J. COOPER, Reason and Emotions. Essays on Ancient Moral 
Psychology and Ethical Theory, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 449-484 ; C. GILL, “Did 
Galen understand Platonic and Stoic thinking on Emotions ?”, in J. SIHVOLA, T. ENGBERG-PEDERSEN, ed., 
The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1998, p. 113-148 ; T. TIELEMAN, Chrysippus’ 
On Affections. Reconstruction and Interpretation, Leiden, Brill, 2003, p. 198-287. 
 28. See D. SEDLEY, Commentarium in Platonis “Theaetetum”, p. 497 ; P. MORAUX, Der Aristotelismus bei 
den Griechen, vol. II, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1984, p. 493. 
 29. Among the “Ancients”, I would suggest that we can enlist together with Plato and Aristotle Pythagoras and 
his adepts, who were equally credited with Platonic-Aristotelian psychology and with the doctrine of the 
mutual implication of virtues. See ps.-Archytas, De educ., p. 40, 19-20 (Thesleff). B. CENTRONE, Pseu- 
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We can then conclude that this fourth testimony exhibits the same strategy 
against the Stoics. Anon. does not explicitly reject the Stoic theory of the mutual im-
plication of virtues ; but rather adapts it to his different Platonic system, on the as-
sumption that only his system is capable of securing adequate foundations to the 
doctrine. In sum, the antakolouthia doctrine is correct, but requires the Platonically 
part-based psychology to make sense. Conversely Stoic monism is fatally condemned 
to one virtue thesis, regardless of what the Stoics claim. 
III. 
In sum, Anon.’s attitude towards Stoicism is more subtle than one may expect. 
Clearly and not surprisingly, the Stoics feature as Anon.’s main adversaries, to the 
effect that some cardinal doctrines such as the “peculiarly qualified” appear to be re-
jected. But this antagonism does not always conclude in an open opposition. For open 
opposition leaves hanging the issue of who is right between the two rivals. And this is 
a conclusion that the engagé Anon. definitely could not accept — and did not accept 
by showing that what is good in Stoicism can make sense only within a Platonist 
background. Anon. can thus settle the dispute by appropriating (and subordinating) 
some of the Stoic cardinal tenets. Controversial as they are, Anon.’s arguments then 
reveal a definite strategy, whose main target is to show that there can be one coherent 
philosophical system only, which is Platonism. And if one considers that Stoicism 
was traditionally praised for the coherence of its system, one can realize how ambi-
tious Anon.’s challenge was. 
In addition, comparing the texts also shows that the confrontation with Stoicism 
is not a separate issue, but is rather part of a wider problem. A major concern of 
Anon. is the definition of his Platonist identity, the establishing of what Platonism 
amounts to, and in this case Stoics prove to be very useful. Facing the issue of ac-
counting for such a complex tradition, composed by different tendencies, dogmatic as 
much as aporetic, Anon. takes a strikingly radical position by claiming that there is 
one single tradition stemming from Plato (LIV 38-LV 13). But what about Hellenistic 
Academics such as Arcesilaos, Carneades and Philo of Larissa ? Their confrontation 
with the Stoics provides the solution. For, as we have seen in particular apropos of 
the “growing argument”, by stressing the importance of the dispute with the Stoics 
Anon. can argue in favour of a dialectical interpretation of the Hellenistic Academics, 
who are presented as “Platonists in terra infidelium”. In their struggle Academics 
presuppose Plato’s philosophy, but, like Socrates in the Theaetetus, their primary tar-
get is to confute the doctrines of their adversaries and not to state their Platonist 
creed. And since their confrontation with Stoic materialism is compatible with the 
cardinal tenets of Platonism, they can be accepted as a legitimate part of the tradition 
stemming from Plato. 
                                       
dopythagorica ethica. I trattati morali di Archita, Metopo, Teage, Eurifamo, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1990, 
p. 29, 186. 
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Anon.’s anti-Stoic arguments show that commenting a text is not a neutral prac-
tice and further confirms that in the philosophical debates of his time, Anon. took a 
definite stance, which I propose to call “hard unitarianism”. Anon. not only assumes 
that Plato’s works constitute a unified and consistent body of doctrine, but he also 
claims that Plato and Platonism coincide and that this consistent body of doctrine en-
dured over the centuries. Moreover, as if this was not enough, he further maintains 
that Plato’s philosophy is the only true philosophy and, as a result, can appropriate 
the doctrines of other schools. To be sure, Anon.’s claims are far from being unques-
tionable, and they have indeed been questioned several times. But the least we can 
conclude is that his commentary is not as arid and uninspiring as has been suggested ; 
it is rather an interesting example of philosophical practice in the Early Imperial 
Age.30 
                                       
 30. My thanks to Harold Tarrant and Andrea Falcon for many helpful suggestions. 
